


THE *Dan Smoot Report*

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DAN SMOOT

REORGANIZING FOR STALEMATE

On March 6, 1963, United States Representative Paul Findley (Republican, Illinois), reminding his associates that the Constitution places upon Congress the responsibility of raising and maintaining armed forces for the United States, placed in the *Congressional Record* (pages A1165-7) an article written for *The Saturday Evening Post* by Hanson W. Baldwin, military analyst for *The New York Times*. Here are passages from the Baldwin article:

"The unification of the armed services sponsored by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara poses some subtle and insidious dangers . . . almost as great a threat to a secure and free nation as the attempted military coup

"For the kind of unification being practiced and preached today has ominous overtones. It is dangerous to the Nation's political system of checks and balances, dangerous to the continued development of sound military advice and effective military leadership, dangerous to managerial and administrative efficiency.

"Mr. McNamara is, first and foremost, trying to make the armed services speak with one voice and attempting to reduce greatly or eliminate altogether interservice competition

"Objections or dissent, even to Congress, are discouraged, muted or, when possible, stifled. Mr. McNamara has pressured the joint Chiefs of Staff to sign written statements testifying to Congress that the administration's defense budget is adequate. He has censored, deleted and altered statements to Congress by the Chiefs of the services and their secretaries. He has downgraded, ignored, bypassed or overruled the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

"For 175 years of our history, separate Army and Navy Departments (and then an Air Force) provided a natural interservice system of checks and balances. The services did not speak with one voice, and politically this was a desirable safeguard. They balanced each other, and their Secretaries provided contrasting viewpoints at Cabinet level. Now only the Secretary of Defense is a Cabinet officer

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"The latest reorganization of the State-controlled National Guard, still opposed by some Governors, may ultimately extend Washington's power over the Guard. Such developments represent dangerous weakening of our traditional military checks and balances.

"Equally threatening to the Nation's future is the concentration of politico-military power, not merely in Washington but in one department The dollar volumes of military contracts amount to more than \$20 billion annually, with billions more in backlog orders outstanding. The individual services no longer have the final power to contract. The rewarding or cancellation of contracts — which may make or break companies and affect thousands of workers — is now ultimately controlled by a very few men in the top echelons of the Defense Department.

"Perhaps the greatest military danger in this centralization and unification is that it overrides the voice of professional experience and substitutes a military party line, a single strategic concept

"The 'one voice' unification trend in the Pentagon presents another potential danger: the development of future generations of officers who will be essentially military yes-men and conformists without the moral courage or leadership qualifications required by the battlefield

"Technical competition between the services is being discouraged despite the lessons of the past. The air-cooled and liquid-cooled aircraft engines which ultimately gave us air supremacy in World War II were a direct result of differing Army and Navy technical concepts and interservice competition

"Finally, what about administrative efficiency; what has Mr. McNamara's brand of unification done to the Pentagon? . . . Contracting, budgeting, progress on weapons systems — even lawn cutting — is programmed and controlled in detail from various echelons of the Secretary's office.

"The reporting and analytical system required has resulted in a tremendous burgeoning of paperwork and great increase in numbers and rank of both civilian and military personnel assigned to echelons above the fighting services in the Department of Defense

"This topheavy system has obvious built-in delay factors, and, as the record of the McNamara administration shows, it is far harder

to start a new project or weapons system than it is to cancel or curtail an old one. In the first 18 months of the McNamara regime, no major new weapons system was started the Defense Department . . . has curtailed, eliminated or held back such important development projects as a future manned-bomber system (the RS-70), the Skybolt air-to-ground missile and the Nike-Zeus anti-ballistic-missile system

"Concentration of power in the hands of the Secretary of Defense has been hastened by the loosening of congressional control over the Pentagon. The power to raise and maintain armies and navies, conveyed to the legislative branch by the Constitution, has been watered down as a result of the sheer immensity and size of the Defense Department, the tremendous increase in Executive power, and the weaknesses and mistakes of Congress itself Congress, by loose legislation, conferred upon the President and the Secretary of Defense such immense power to reorganize the Pentagon that it has, in the view of some legislators, virtually abandoned its former power to check, control, and approve every detail of defense policy and organization

"If the Pentagon ever does speak with one voice, if the Nation's Armed Forces do come, as the trend now indicates, to represent a monolithic military-political point of view, both freedom and security will be in jeopardy through the slow erosion of democracy into a garrison state and the stagnant conformity that leads to combat ineffectiveness."

On May 4, 1963, *The Saturday Evening Post* published an article by General Thomas D. White (former Air Force Chief of Staff, now retired) who said that "academic theorists" ("defense intellectuals"), now in charge of our defense, lack understanding of war and of the enemy whom we may have to fight. General White said:

"I am profoundly apprehensive of the pipe-smoking, tree-full-of-owls type of so-called professional 'defense intellectuals' who have been brought into this nation's capital. I don't believe a lot of these often overconfident, sometimes arrogant young professors, mathematicians and other theorists have sufficient worldliness or motivation to stand up to the kind of enemy we face

"Our military officers . . . will have to carry out the military aspects of our national strategy. They will have to fight under the plans and orders and with the weapons which have evolved under the influence of those, often far junior in age and experience, who come into Government, for a few years at most, from colleges and foundations"

General White says the civilian "defense intellectuals" call their own jobs "thinking about the unthinkable," which in itself is a "weightless dreamland." These strategy makers refuse to accept lessons of military history, and the experience of combat veterans.

The aspect of the McNamara regime, most disturbing to General White, is that ruling "intellectuals" base everything — strategy, weapons systems, personnel acquisition — on the political ideal of *compromise*, not on the military ideal of *victory*: a military establishment which does not plan to win is not likely to win; and is more likely to accept defeat than to achieve acceptable compromise.

General White shows that "thinking about the unthinkable," by defense intellectuals, is supported by McNamara and is, evidently, his own philosophy as well. Specifically, General White notes that McNamara's appearances before Congressional committees during 1963 indicate that *stalemate* between America and the Soviet Union is our highest aim. General White says:

"For example, attainment by the Soviet Union of a second-strike capability would mean, in simple terms, a very considerable net increase in our enemy's military strength and nuclear power. Yet Mr. McNamara is quoted . . . as saying that the Soviets will achieve a 'sure second-strike capability.' . . . [and] 'the sooner . . . the better.' I am dead certain the majority of military men flatly disagree with the concept that a major increase in enemy strength is helpful"

On September 4, 1963, Admiral George W. Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations until "retired" by President Kennedy in August, 1963, delivered an angry address to the National Press Club in Washington, D. C., repeating, essentially,

the arguments of General White. Here are excerpts from Admiral Anderson's speech:

"There is . . . alarming peril to obscuring the role of the military, found in a modern fallacy that theories, or computers, or economics, or numbers of weapons win wars. Alone, they do not! Man is the key to success or failure"

"There are some tendencies which give me great concern, a concern shared by many in uniform today and by many who have previously served their country in military and civilian positions."⁽¹⁾

Admiral Anderson called attention to six specific developments which worry him:

1. Downgrading military recommendations on weapons and reversal of military recommendations, such as in the TFX contract;
2. Lack of "confidence and trust between the military and civilian echelons";
3. Subordination of military experience to academic theory;
4. Overcentralization in the Defense structure which can "kill imagination, stultify initiative and completely eliminate the effectiveness of those . . . who have gained wisdom and experience";
5. "A tendency to draw conclusions before all the evidence has been examined";
6. Failure to maintain naval strength while "the Soviets are moving forward rapidly on the high seas."⁽¹⁾

Background

The Billy Mitchell dispute of the 1920's was an early harbinger of the present controversy over reorganization of American military establishments, and the public does not yet know the truth about the Billy Mitchell affair. Brigadier General Billy Mitchell, U. S. Army, has been popularized as a patriot who sacrificed self to break through the wall of stuffy ignorance and arrogance which kept our Armed Forces from accepting new ideas. Billy Mitchell, the legend goes, was the real Founding Father of American air power.

Billy Mitchell did foresee more clearly than some the importance of air power. He wanted the Air Corps (then merely a section of the Army Signal Corps) elevated to a Department, on a par with the Army and the Navy. A significant part of the Mitchell objective has been ignored, however, in dramatizations of his case: Mitchell wanted an Air Force Department to have not only a monopoly of all military aviation, but also autocratic control of *commercial* aviation and of *private* aircraft building.⁽²⁾

President Coolidge appointed an Advisory Commission, headed by Dwight Morrow, to investigate.

The Dwight Morrow investigation and recommendations eventuated in a reorganization which separated the Air Corps from the Signal Corps, making it a separate branch of the Army. The office of Assistant Secretary for Air was established in the War Department (the Department of the Army then being known as the Department of War). An Assistant Secretary for Air was also established in the Navy Department.⁽²⁾ This remained, essentially, the organizational arrangement of American Armed Forces until after World War II.

Marshall's Plan

During the heaviest fighting of World War II, General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, found time to propose a general reorganization. The Marshall Plan (rather informally, and sketchily, presented as a memorandum circulated to high officials in September, 1943) became the basis and the outline of a grand design which is now realizing fulfillment under McNamara and Kennedy.

Marshall wanted the Air Corps separated from the Army and established as a military organization on a par with the Army and the Navy, but he did not suggest elevating the Air Force to Department level. Rather, he wanted the old Departments of War and Navy abolished, their status as Departments with Cabinet representation eliminated. In their place would be one De-

partment of War (or Department of Defense) whose secretary would be a member of the President's Cabinet, to speak ("with one voice") for all the Armed Forces. The three main branches of the Armed Forces (Army, Navy, Air) would be on a par with each other but would not have individual Cabinet representation. Not only would they be under a single civilian head (the Secretary of War, or Secretary of Defense) but they would also be under a single military head — one chief of staff in charge of all branches of the Armed Forces, answerable to the one Secretary of Defense and to the President.⁽³⁾

Arguments for such a monolithic structure in our Armed Forces have some theoretical plausibility: elimination of inter-service rivalry, better co-ordination of all forces, elimination of duplication and waste. But the theory ignores the lessons of history and the combat experience of American fighting men.

Inter-service "rivalry" has been, in large part, responsible for the superior morale and esprit de corps which distinguish Americans in combat — which can be, and in many critical times have been, more important than weapons, supplies, or organization.

Temporary arrangements for unified battle action by separate (and "rival") branches of American military forces have produced brilliant successes—often because the arrangements necessarily left a great deal of leeway for improvisation, ingenuity, and individual initiative on the part of lower echelon commanders. A massive military operation, which spreads across thousands of miles and involves millions of men with all types of equipment under a multitude of unpredictable conditions, can be choked to death by unification and tight control by one desk man at the top.

As to waste and duplication: these are perennial evils of bureaucracy, military and civilian. There seems to be a law of proportion which should counsel us to keep the military and the civilian bureaucracy divided and fragmented into the smallest ("rival") units possible. Waste,

duplication, and inefficiency of a governmental unit, agency, or department (military or civilian) seem to *multiply* in geometric proportions as the size of the unit *increases* — which means that a governmental unit large enough to have a 2 billion dollar budget is generally about *four* times as wasteful and inefficient as one large enough to have a 1 billion dollar budget.

The George Marshall clique in the Pentagon (which included Eisenhower in Europe) pushed hard for the unification plan of having a single Chief of Staff and a single Secretary of Defense; but the thin plausibility of their arguments did not carry enough weight. They resorted to skillful maneuver and intrigue.

In 1946, the Army's Historical Division (studying operations in the European Theatre during the late war) asked three former chiefs of staff of the German Army to tell what happened on their side during the war and to give their views on reorganization of our Armed Forces. The three were: General Franz Halder (German Army Chief of Staff 1938-1942), General Kurt Zeitzler (Chief of Staff 1942-1944), and General Heinz Guderian (1944 to 1945). Of the three, Guderian was belligerent and uncooperative. Halder and Zeitzler avoided making specific recommendations, but did prepare a historical study reflecting opposition to the kind of centralized power being proposed for the American military. Halder and Zeitzler (like a great majority of German generals) felt that the single Chief of Staff arrangement (with tight concentration and unification of power in one man) was a primary reason for Germany's defeat: it produced rigidity in times of crisis, prohibiting commanders from altering plans to meet unforeseen developments, holding German forces to a preconceived plan of action which battle-field developments rendered ineffective, even suicidal.⁽³⁾

These German generals seemed in sympathy with Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz (Hitler's successor as "fuehrer") who rejects the fascist-communist ideal of concentrated political power, and advocates a governmental system based on old American constitutional principles.⁽⁴⁾

The George Marshall clique of political managers who dominated Pentagon planning in the postwar period, disliked the ideas of such Germans as Halder, Zeitzler, and Doenitz. They turned to the bellicose Guderian for a recommendation. Guderian is one of very few German generals who advocates the totalitarian state (and who has been active in totalitarian politics since World War II).⁽⁵⁾

The Guderian Plan

In 1947, Congress enacted a law authorizing partial reorganization of the Armed Forces along the lines of the Marshall Plan. The Navy Department was reduced from Cabinet level. The War Department was changed to Department of the Army and also reduced from Cabinet level; and a new Department of the Air Force was created. The three services were called "The National Military Establishment," and were under one civilian head, the new Secretary of Defense. Militarily, however, the three services were directed by a Joint Chiefs of Staff (a committee of Chiefs of Staff representing the three branches): Congress, after bitter controversy, had rejected the single Chief of Staff arrangement. James Forrestal (last Secretary of the old Department of the Navy) was named the first Secretary of Defense — an irony of fate (or a display of Trumanism), because Forrestal was the foremost foe of Armed Forces unification.⁽⁶⁾

The 1947 reorganization was a compromise, pushed through Congress amidst a fury of confused and confusing conflict. It produced a cumbersome system which could not work; ⁽⁶⁾ but in 1948, German General Guderian completed *his* plan for reorganization of the American Armed Forces.

The Guderian Plan would create an all-powerful military dictatorship with the President as its totalitarian head — or its tool. Guderian would not only establish the old German unified command system, but would also put the military high command in tight control of civilian aviation, civilian transportation, and civilian commu-

nications (communications including radio, television, and press; and telegraph and telephone services).⁽³⁾

The Guderian Plan has become a blueprint for all U. S. military reorganization plans made or attempted since 1948. The total Plan, not yet in effect, is being achieved a step at a time. Congress has permitted these dangerous developments by abdicating (in the Reorganization Act of 1949) its own constitutional powers and responsibilities.

The Constitution gives to Congress, exclusively, the power to legislate, and to the President the negative role of approving or vetoing what Congress does. Even the negative veto power is limited: Congress can legislate in defiance of presidential veto, if two-thirds of both houses desire.

The Reorganization Act of 1949 reverses this process, with regard to certain vital matters, permitting the President to *legislate*, reducing Congress to the role of vetoing what the President does. Specifically, the Reorganization Act of 1949 permits the President to reorganize the executive establishment (abolish agencies or departments created by Congress; create agencies or departments not authorized by Congress; transfer responsibilities from an agency where Congress had assigned them, to another agency where Congress had not intended the responsibilities to rest). The President merely sends his Reorganization Plans (i.e., "presidential legislation") to Congress. If Congress does not veto the Plans within 60 days, they become law.

The unconstitutional "authority" conferred on the President by the Reorganization Act of 1949 was first used, for steps toward military centralization, in 1953. President Eisenhower appointed Nelson A. Rockefeller (member of the Council on Foreign Relations) as head of a commission to make a study and proposal for military reorganization. The Rockefeller Report, recommending more centralization of power, became the basis of an Eisenhower Reorganization Plan (sent to Congress on April 30, 1953, and not vetoed) which concentrated more power than

theretofore in the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁽⁶⁾

Step By Step

It seemed a timid step. More propaganda work on the Congress and the public was needed before bolder measures could be taken without arousing the nation. The Council on Foreign Relations undertook the propaganda job — subtly and unobtrusively, of course.

J. Robert Oppenheimer (notorious former associate of communist espionage agents and member of the Council on Foreign Relations) wrote an article for the July, 1953, issue of *Foreign Affairs* (principal publication of the CFR), advocating de-emphasis, and eventual elimination, of nuclear weapons from American Armed Forces, arguing for conventional forces and armaments which might (as General Thomas White now phrases it) produce *stalemate* with, rather than *victory* over, communist forces.⁽⁷⁾ In 1954, the CFR organized "discussion groups" to "study" foreign policy and defense in the nuclear age. All the emphasis was on preventing American preparation for a *nuclear war*.⁽⁸⁾

Good sense and logic seemed to have more influence on public thought than CFR efforts had. It was obvious that America could not match the communist slave empire in *manpower* for the kind of "conventional" forces that Oppenheimer and others urged us to depend on. We could, however, with our superior technology and industrial capacity, outstrip the Soviets in production of nuclear and other new types of weapons. It was obvious that the next war would be fought with the new weapons; that it would be short and violent; and that it would probably be over before massive land armies and other "conventional" forces and weapons were ever brought into action. International political events also made it obvious that American dependence on foreign bases left us at the mercy of foreign nations who, even in times of peace, when they were on the American dole, often seemed friendlier to the Soviets than to us. Dependence on such

nations for use of bases on their soil, in times of war when they would be under blackmail threats by the Soviet Union, could be disastrous.

A growing public comprehension of such obvious conditions led to revival of the traditional, and sound, Fortress America concept of national defense: the concept that we must defend our homeland, because we have neither the responsibility nor the capability of defending and policing the world.

Leading military men, with combat experience — like Admiral Arthur W. Radford — publicly supported the idea of de-emphasizing foreign bases and foreign military entanglements, arguing for a reduction of spending on “conventional” forces so that our resources could be devoted to production of such super-weapons as missiles and intercontinental, supersonic bombers, which would deter enemy aggression by threatening enemy destruction in the event of war.

The Council on Foreign Relations intensified its propaganda efforts. Some of the results were Dr. Henry A. Kissinger’s book, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, published in 1957;⁽⁸⁾ and, in 1958, a Rockefeller Brothers Fund “study,”⁽⁹⁾ the Gaither Committee Report,⁽¹⁰⁾ and a Rand Corporation book for the Air Force on how American military forces could strategically surrender to avoid bloodshed.⁽¹¹⁾

In essence, all of these “studies” supported the thesis that control of our military establishments should be tightly concentrated at the top, and that emphasis in weapons-development, strategy, troop indoctrination, and general policy should be on stalemate and compromise with the enemy rather than victory.

Authorized by a specific law of Congress in 1958 (Defense Reorganization Act), Eisenhower took another step toward implementing the Guderian Plan — further concentrating power in the Secretary of Defense and in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shifting responsibility for *military* planning away from officers with combat experience, putting it in the hands of desk officers and civilians.

McNamara and Kennedy

With the groundwork prepared, Kennedy and McNamara have taken giant strides toward converting the American Armed Forces into a mammoth political-economic complex whose spending dominates the national economy, and whose primary purpose (as dictated by “intellectuals” at the top) appears to be, not defense of the nation against foreign enemies, but defense of the administration’s political objectives against the American people.

In short, Kennedy and McNamara are placing in charge of our defenses, not experienced military officers, but political commissars to promote programs of the administration.

Next week: “McNamara’s Commissars.”

Bound Volume VIII

The year 1964 may be the most important election year in the history of the United States. From now until election day in November, 1964, voters must have facts about what is going on. Getting hard facts about the policies and programs of government is becoming increasingly difficult. The noose of censorship is tightening: conservative news commentary is being choked off radio and television; major magazines and newspapers are becoming mere outlets for governmental propaganda handouts.

This condition re-emphasizes the importance of such publications as this *Report* — which present unvarnished truth, using the Constitution of the United States as the touchstone for evaluation. Few such publications are still in existence, and the number is shrinking.

Of special importance are the extensively indexed bound volumes of the *Report*. The only one still available is Volume VIII (containing all *Reports* published in 1962). This volume is especially useful, not only for students, teachers, writers, and speakers, but for all who want facts for enlightened understanding of the great issues

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FOOTNOTES

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WHO IS DAN SMOOT?

Born in Missouri, reared in Texas, Dan Smoot went to SMU in Dallas, getting BA and MA degrees in 1938 and 1940. In 1941, he joined the faculty at Harvard as a Teaching Fellow in English, doing graduate work for a doctorate in American Civilization.

In 1942, he left Harvard and joined the FBI. As an FBI Agent, he worked for three and a half years on communist investigations in the industrial Midwest; two years as an administrative assistant to J. Edgar Hoover on FBI headquarters staff in Washington; and almost four years on general FBI cases in various parts of the nation.

In 1951, Smoot resigned from the FBI and helped start Facts Forum. On Facts Forum radio and television programs, Smoot spoke to a national audience, giving *both* sides of controversial issues.

In July, 1955, he resigned and started his present independent publishing and broadcasting business — a free-enterprise operation financed entirely by profits from sales: sales of *The Dan Smoot Report*, a weekly magazine; and sales of a weekly news-analysis broadcast, to business firms, for use on radio and television as an advertising vehicle. The *Report* and the broadcast give only *one* side in presenting documented truth about important issues — the side that uses the American Constitution as a yardstick. The *Report* is available by subscription; and the broadcasts are available for commercial sponsorship, anywhere in the United States.

If you think Dan Smoot is providing effective tools for Americans fighting socialism and communism, you can help immensely — by helping him get more customers for his *Report* and broadcasts.